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New Frontiers in Democratic Self-Management 
by Rory Ridley-Duff 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the focus is on considering the way legal forms for co-operative enterprise are 
designed to meet the needs of members.  In developing a critique of the investor-owned firm, I will 
critically evaluate the role of legal membership in establishing a co-operative enterprise and how 
this supports the development of a co-operative identity (Atherton et al. 2011).  The purpose is to 
distinguish conceptually between common ownership, joint ownership and co-ownership, and their 
potential influence on future co-operative development. 
 I will argue that the mediation of business purpose and social identity through the choice of 
legal form influences the power and wealth sharing arrangements of a co-operative enterprise.  
Furthermore, the emergence of social enterprise has challenged co-operative models based on 
common ownership by a single stakeholder to produce hybrid models that express co-operative 
values and principles in new ways (Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011). 
 The chapter is divided into four sections.  In the first, the impact of co-operative values and 
principles in framing a co-operative identity is elaborated.  The concept of ‘socialisation’ is 
contrasted with ‘privatisation’ and ‘nationalisation’ to develop the argument that co-operatives 
socialise power, wealth and property.   In the second section, I characterize approaches based on the 
extent to which they socialise and democratise capital.  In this section, I distinguish common 
ownership from joint ownership and co-ownership models (Reeves, 2007).  In the third section, 
these ideas and concepts are linked to model rules.  In two cases, the model rules represent an 
evolution of co-operative models to make them more open to the participation of primary 
stakeholders.  In a third case, I examine how a co-ownership model has developed over time.  
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Lastly, I draw together the arguments and consider whether emergent 'hybrid' co-operatives 
represent examples of progress or naïve forms of liberalism that inhibit a co-operative economy.  
Values, Identities and Social Practices  
The interaction between social and legal identity is at the heart of ongoing debates about the 
contribution of mutuality and co-operative enterprise to the social economy (Amin, 2009).  
Deciding upon, and evolving, a particular legal form is an important formative process for the 
founders of any enterprise.  As Davies (2002:7) points out: 
It is the initial shareholders of a company who bring it into existence…and who become the 
first members of the organization thus created.  Subsequent shareholders also become 
members of the company.  The point is of theoretical, even ideological, significance, 
because the train of thought which makes the shareholders the members of the company 
leads naturally to making the shareholders’ interests predominant within company law. 
Table 1 shows the significance of the legal arrangements for membership, and the different 
long-term outcomes that can occur when a co-operative model is chosen over one designed to 
privatise ownership and control.   In an article about football supporter trusts, a comparison is made 
between Barcelona and Arsenal football clubs: 
Table 1 – The Camp Nou Way 
 Barcelona Arsenal 
Shareholders In 2006, there were 142,000 members 
(“socios”) voting on a one-person, one-
vote basis.  By 2010, this was reported 
to have grown to 170,000. 
In 2006, there were 4 major 
shareholders1 who owned 87% of voting 
shares.  By 2012, two shareholders 
controlled 96% of shares. 
Leadership The president is elected by members for 
a four-year term (maximum two terms). 
No meaningful elections.  The chair of the 
Board is decided by major shareholders. 
Cheapest adult season ticket £69 £885 
Most expensive adult season 
ticket 
£579 £1,825 
(based on Conn, 2006) 
                                                 
1  Wikipedia, on 8th December 2009, stated that 86.9% of shares were held by four shareholders: Stan 
Kroenke (29.9%), Danny Fiszman (16.1%), Nina Bracewell-Smith (15.9%) and Red & White Securities 
(25%).  By 2012, 66.82% were controlled by Kroenke, and 29.35% by Red & White Securities.  Under 
Company Law, Kroenke is obliged to make an offer to the shares held by Red & White Securities. 
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The body of law under which Barcelona is constituted is similar to the Mondragon 
co-operatives.  The key difference, however, is that the members are football fans (consumers) 
rather than a workforce.  When compared to an investor-owned firm, this arrangement leads to 
different long-term outcomes (both internally and externally).  In the case of Arsenal (a privately-
owned football club), the pricing strategy is set to maximise profit for financial investors (who 
dominate the group of shareholders).  Shares are not publicly available and are traded in secret 
amongst a select group of people.  Season ticket prices for fans are high.  In the case of Barcelona (a 
football club owned by its fans), membership is offered to football fans rather than financial 
investors.  This extends ownership throughout the community, and dramatically reduces the cost of 
season tickets because supporters’ rather than financial investors’ interests are dominant.  
Birchall (2009) distinguishes between three broad types of co-operative enterprise:  
 Consumer co-operatives (owned by the users/buyers of a particular product or service) 
 Producer co-operatives (owned by independent producers to market their produce) 
 Employee co-operatives (owned and controlled directly by a workforce)  
All of these forms represent an alternative to the investor-owned firm because stakeholders 
are admitted to membership for a reason other than the supply of financial capital.  It is this that 
differentiates a co-operative economy from one dominated by capital ownership.  In the case of 
consumer co-operatives, it is the act of purchasing goods from the co-operative that provides the 
rationale for membership.  In producer co-operatives it is the act of contributing produce, while in 
an employee co-operative, it is the act of contributing labour. 
 The co-operative model, therefore, gives rise to the concept of a ‘socialised’ enterprise 
(Ellerman, 1984, 1997; Ridley-Duff and Southcombe, 2011).  A working definition of what 'social' 
means in this context is elaborated by Ellerman (1997).  He sought to clarify the ambiguous use of 
the terms 'public' and 'private'.  He argued that 'public rights' accorded to people as citizens are 
different to the notion of ‘public ownership’ by the state.  The former disperses power and influence 
to individual citizens while the latter concentrates power into the hands of politicians.  He uses the 
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term ‘social’ to describe the granting of personal rights, and distinguishes them from property rights 
because the latter can be inherited, bequeathed and sold to others while the former cannot.  Personal 
rights are acquired when someone joins a co-operative enterprise and they cease when they die or 
leave.  Socialised enterprises, therefore, are characterised by the efforts of managers and members 
to grant personal rights to primary stakeholders (producers, customers, employees) so that they 
acquire control over the financial, social and human capital of their enterprise. 
While ‘socialisation’ is linked to democratisation, it goes beyond voting rights to elect 
leaders.  It extends to participation in the creation and maintenance of socially inclusive working 
practices that transform the nature and purpose of work.  The concept is useful for problematising 
the characteristics of private, social and nationalised enterprises (see Table 2), highlighting their 
differences, and advancing the argument for ‘associative democracy’ made by Hirst (1994).  
A co-operative company or society is organised on a different basis to a private company or state 
institution (Tawney, 1921, 1931; Cornforth et al., 1988; Cornforth, 1995).  As a consequence, it 
forges different behaviours amongst its stakeholders and members (Hill, 2000; Parnell, 2011).   
Davies (2002), not unreasonably, questions why the norms of private investor-led 
companies dominate business education.  In private companies, the norm is to recognise founding 
and institutional investors as members, and to be more cautious about admitting directors, 
employees and customers into membership.  But why are primary stakeholders who produce and 
consume goods and services denied membership?  The question is an important one because co-
operative enterprises are typically designed to reverse or adapt this arrangement, and provide an 
anti-thesis to the privatisation of knowledge, property and capital.  
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Table 2 – Privatisation, Socialisation and Nationalisation 
*Primary stakeholders = workforce members, producers, customers and/or service users 
**Capital = Human, Social and Financial Capital 
 Privatisation Socialisation Nationalisation 
Key 
Characteristic 
The acquisition of public/social 
rights by private 
individuals/corporations to 
bring capital** under private 
(management) control. 
The sharing of public/social 
rights amongst primary 
stakeholders* so they can 
jointly control an enterprise’s 
capital, and participate in 
enterprise management. 
The acquisition of public/social 
rights by a government body so 
the state can exercise 
management control over an 
enterprise’s capital. 
Human Capital 
Examples 
Copyright Law, Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Patents. 
Creative Commons, Wikipedia, 
Open Source movement 
Legislation to limit duration or 
scope of copyrights/patents. 
Working 
Practices 
 
Decided by managers / 
governors who act for the 
private interests they 
represent, sometimes after 
consultation with primary 
stakeholders. 
Decided by participatory 
(democratic) management 
practices, or by elected 
managers / governors 
accountable to primary 
stakeholders. 
Decided by appointed officials / 
elected politicians to fulfil a 
political programme, 
sometimes after consultation 
with an electorate or 
constituency. 
Intellectual 
Property 
 
Acquisition of rights to use and 
commercialise fully formed 
ideas and designs created by 
producers/employees. 
Distribution and/or sharing of 
fully formed ideas so producers 
can use, share and exchange 
them in new creative works. 
Acquisition of fully formed 
ideas by a government body so 
it can be exploited for public or 
state benefit. 
Social Capital 
Examples 
Marks & Spencer, IBM, Hewlett 
Packard 
Mondragon, John Lewis, 
Co-operative Group 
Direct government control of 
employee / consumer relations 
Management 
Control 
 
Avoidance / rejection of 
collective bargaining on 
working conditions; rejection of 
primary stakeholder 
participation in strategic 
decision-making. 
Acceptance of collective 
bargaining arrangements on 
working conditions; workforce 
and/or consumer participation 
in strategic decision-making. 
State control of working 
conditions.  State control of 
participation rights and 
interpretations of ‘national 
interest’. 
Governance 
 
Exclusion of primary 
stakeholders from participation 
in governance and audit (except 
as providers of information). 
Equal participation of primary 
stakeholders in governance and 
audit, and/or accountability to 
primary stakeholders. 
Participation of government 
appointees / politicians in 
governance and audit, and/or 
accountability to politicians. 
Financial 
Capital 
Examples 
Arsenal FC, Sainsbury’s, 
Holland & Barrett 
Barcelona FC, Sunderland Care 
Home Associates, Suma 
Wholefoods 
Armed Forces, Central Banks, 
Local Governments 
Ownership 
 
Individual or corporate control 
over membership; shares 
issued in exchange for financial 
capital. 
Open membership / capital 
rights for primary stakeholders; 
shares issued in exchange for 
labour/consumer participation. 
State control of membership 
and share capital, and/or 
statutory controls over their 
issue. 
Investment 
 
Capital provided by (private) 
members and/or banks (loans) 
and/or capital markets (equity 
shares).  
Capital provided primarily by 
primary stakeholders, 
supplemented by private/public 
funds (if this does not 
compromise member-control). 
Capital provided from tax 
revenues; private / social 
enterprise involvement under 
commercial contracts. 
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All forms are retained to the extent that they produce the outcomes that are sought, and can 
develop and protect the educational, political and economic environments needed to sustain them 
(Alvesson and Deetz, 2000).  Co-operative legal forms have evolved to suit the needs of primary 
stakeholders rather than financial investors.  In the context of a discussion about co-operatives, the 
question is whether a given co-operative form effectively ‘socialises’ human, social and financial 
capital, prevents control by private interests and/or state bodies, and leads to desired changes in 
enterprise performance. 
The Role of Ideology 
Many writers on the left of the political spectrum have tracked the tendency of people in a society to 
become imbued with particular ways of thinking, and for the ideas of a dominant class to become 
pervasive (Lukes, 1974).  Marx’s work remains helpful for appreciating how the ideas of a 
dominant class spread, as well as how people develop the consciousness needed to challenge the 
social and economic institutions they create (Cornforth, 1959; Marx, 1984).  Revolutions, whether 
fought violently in the public sphere or silently in the privacy of one’s own mind (Friere, 1970), 
occur when a class of people previously subordinated by a socio-economic system start to 
circumvent systems of control and create new political and economic institutions.   At any particular 
point in time there are likely to be forms of organisation that do not conform to the dominant 
ideology, and which potentially offer embryonic models for economic transformation (Cornforth, 
1959; Alvesson and Deetz, 2000).  As Hill (2000) points out, the existence of organisations that do 
not conform to existing norms should trigger debates in educational settings as they call into 
question taken-for-granted assumptions. 
Marx, for example, tracked how privately financed merchants increased their control over 
economic and political thought until their way of thinking dominated the institutions of industry and 
government (Marx, 1984; Gray, 1998; Polanyi, 2001).  We can observe that dominance today in the 
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popularity of TV programmes like The Apprentice (in which Alan Sugar famously tells participants 
‘you’re fired’), and The Dragon’s Den, in which celebrity entrepreneurs select enterprises in which 
to make investments.  We can also observe the challenges to that dominance by a growing number 
of Occupy protests, the growth of the fair trade movement (Lacey, 2009), and internet-based 
organisations in civil society that promote collective action to bring about social change (see 
www.avaaz.org and www.change.org). 
Kalmi (2007) tracks how the dominant approach embodied in The Apprentice and Dragon’s 
Den - based on the primacy of investor interests and management control - has ‘colonised’ 
economic and business textbooks to the exclusion of co-operative economics and democratic 
management.  This ideological dominance, however, does not correlate to what is actually occurring 
at a grassroots level.  He found that changes in textbooks and university curricula across Europe 
were not correlated with changes in the economy.  Even as discussion in academic texts fell, the 
scope and number of co-operative enterprises was steadily growing (see also Birchall, 2009; 
Co-operatives UK, 2011a; United Nations, 2011). 
Hill (2000) finds much the same in an American-Canadian context.  Despite widespread 
membership of co-operatives and credit unions amongst US and Canadian citizens, most university 
textbooks on economic development fail to mention, define or discuss either co-operatives or credit 
unions.  Hill helpfully suggests how economics (and by implication all disciplines concerned with 
enterprise creation and development) can benefit from discussing co-operative models.  Their 
presence in some markets and absence from others raises questions about the reasons for the 
existence of different types of enterprise.  Their continued existence problematizes any discussion 
based on the assumption that the only choice is between investor-owned and state-owned 
enterprises.  Lastly, co-operative approaches to managing, owning and allocating resources can be 
discussed as a support strategy for the advancement of democratic values advocated by politicians. 
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Reshaping Perceptions of the Co-operative Economy 
Perceptions of the scale of the co-operative economy are being reshaped by the publicity 
surrounding the 2012 United Nations International Year of Cooperatives.  Publicity materials 
(Cooperatives UK, 2011b) make three substantial claims: that membership of co-operatives 
worldwide has grown to 1 billion (200 million more than in 1994); that job creation is now 20% 
higher than multi-national corporations; and that co-operatives secure the livelihoods of 3 billion 
people (half the world’s population).  These claims can be traced to reports for the United Nations 
in 1994, and the ILO in 2001, as they each framed a response to the co-operative movement’s 
continued growth.  Some claims are grounded in the ICA’s own membership and employment data 
(ILO, 2001), updated for the launch of the UN International Year of Cooperatives (Cooperatives 
UK, 2011).  However, the claim that co-operatives secure 3 billion livelihoods appears more 
tenuous, derived from a creative interpretation of a report that 2.3 billion people (59% of the 
working age population) have a ‘close relationship’ to a co-operative (United Nations, 1994, p. 4).  
Even if a rhetorical strategy, the question “why are co-operative businesses – given that they 
generate employment commensurate or greater than multinational corporations – not studied widely 
in business schools?” remains a legitimate and unanswered question. 
In addition to single stakeholder co-operatives (producer, consumer and worker), Atherton 
et al. (2011) delineate different types of multi-stakeholder co-operative that promote solidarity 
between primary stakeholders.  The argument here is that a greater ‘co-operative advantage’ can be 
achieved if the inter-dependence of producers, workers and consumers is acknowledged and 
equitably managed (Retaskis, 2010).  So, a contemporary understanding of co-operative models 
requires sensitivity to the diverse range of co-operative forms and the range of ways in which 
co-operative values and principles can be expressed.  Ownership mechanisms vary from non-equity 
schemes in which assets are placed under common ownership, to equity schemes in which each 
member is allocated a share of the property created by the co-operative. 
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To explore this diversity, I review each end of the historical spectrum and consider the 
works of Owen (1816) and Parnell (2011).  Parnell takes the view that humans are not ‘naturally’ 
altruistic or selfish, and that co-operation occurs whenever people establish that co-operating will 
advance their individual, family or group interests more effectively than acting alone.  Their 
propensity to be altruistic and selfish will depend on the situation, the knowledge they possess 
regarding the costs and benefits of co-operation, and their capacity to interpret the level of threat in 
a given social situation.  As he points out:  
Dishonest, sharp practice and unwarranted selfishness are infectious forms of behaviour 
and are fostered when people feel powerless and that they are being treated unfairly.  
Conversely, if as members of a CME [co-operative and mutual enterprise] they are treated 
fairly, learn to co-operate and begin to recognise the value of interdependence, then these 
kinds of behaviour will also be contagious. 
Parnell (2011: 9) 
This view accords with the conclusions of Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993) after a 
longitudinal study of civic traditions in Italy.  They found that high-trust and low-trust cultures tend 
to reinforce themselves, and that high-trust cultures lower transaction costs, leading to higher levels 
of citizen satisfaction, as well as improvements in economic and social well-being.  Their 
conclusion, that democratic cultures create and disperse wealth more quickly and equitably than 
authoritarian cultures, adds substantially to the case for close study of co-operative models.   
Parnell (2011), like Robert Owen, views the human character as malleable, as something 
that is affected by the education that is provided to organisation members.  Unlike Owen, however, 
Parnell saw cooperativism as a development of individualism, in which people voluntarily band 
together on account of a common bond.  The bond can vary from a shared desire to buy healthy 
food at reasonable prices (loose), or shared interest in a particular industry (moderate), to passionate 
support for a particular sports team (tight).  For Parnell, the common bond is paramount, and 
becomes the rationale for the offer of membership.  It follows that there will be a wide array of 
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enterprises, each based on their own common bond, but which will be equipped to band together 
into a co-operative commonwealth and contribute to the evolution of a new society. 
Owen (1816) on the other hand, argued that co-operation needed to be carefully planned 
from the outset and supported by an education system that teaches co-operative principles from an 
early age.  He attempted to create co-operative communities (like mini city states) "to induce each 
man to have charity for all men".  He believed firmly that this goal was achievable because the 
human mind had a ‘plastic quality’ that could be ‘moulded’ by an educator.  Owen's communitarian 
sentiments, while progressive in terms of educational pedagogy, still represents a top-down model 
of social activism reminiscent of Fabianism, in which wealthy people gift their knowledge and 
assets to develop the working class while retaining control of the value systems that guide their 
social development.  Parnell’s arguments draw more on arguments put forward by Friere (1970) on 
the effects of grassroots organising: 
Some may think it inadvisable to include the people as investigators in the search for their 
own meaningful thematics: that their intrusive influence (n.b., the “intrusion” of those who 
are most interested – or ought to be – in their own education) will “adulterate” the findings 
and thereby sacrifice the objectivity of the investigation.  This view mistakenly presupposes 
that themes exist, in their original objective purity, outside people – as if themes were 
things.  Actually, themes exist in people in their relations with the world…” 
Friere, 1970, p. 106. 
Different assumptions about ‘best practice’ produce different organisational solutions and 
systems for membership, each believed by their advocates to increase social inclusion and 
workplace democracy.  Owen’s (1816) perspective is not simply communitarian (based on a model 
of human character that is formed through the act of receiving an education), but is unitary in that 
he expected elites to shape co-operative institutions for the common good (Harrison, 1969).  
Parnell’s view is not just more individualistic in its philosophical grounding, but also more 
pluralistic in the expectation that a growing number of semi-autonomous co-operators and 
co-operatives will create collaborative social networks (compare Putnam et al., 1993; Retaskis, 
2010).  Figure 1 connects these assumptions with conceptualisations of ownership and control. 
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Figure 1 - A Meta-Theoretical Model of Co-operative Ownership 
Communitarianism
Identity is 
socially constructed
Private Ownership
Enterprises owned and 
controlled by founder(s) and 
investors to the exclusion of 
primary stakeholders
(Not a co-operative)
Common Ownership
Enterprises owned and 
controlled by a legal entity 
for a primary stakeholder 
with no share capital issued
(e.g. mutuals/cooperatives 
owned by trusts, mutuals 
and cooperatives)
Joint Ownership
Enterprises owned by a 
primary stakeholder group  
through individual member 
accounts.
(Mutuals/cooperatives jointly 
owned by individual 
members)
Co-ownership
Combining common and 
joint ownership systems to 
promote social solidarity 
between stakeholders.
(Mixed ownership systems 
that recognise individual and 
organisational members)
Pluralism
Society is best served by 
encouraging diversity
Unitarism
Society is best served 
by creating consensus
Individualism
Identity is 
a product of free will
 
Adapted from Ridley-Duff, 2007, p. 384. 
A much discussed example of common ownership is the John Lewis Partnership.  As people 
join, they become ‘partners’ and beneficiaries of an Employee Trust that owns John Lewis 
Department Stores and Waitrose.  Employees do not buy shares in their employer, nor do they 
receive dividends on shares.  Instead, they become beneficiaries of a trust that exists to own their 
employer for their benefit, and which receives its trading surpluses.  Over the last decade bonuses 
ranging from 9 – 20% of annual earnings have been paid out in addition to wages 
(Wikipedia, 2011).  Partners elect 80% of 82 members of a partnership council that handles non-
commercial aspects, and 5 of the 12 commercial directors.  In addition, there are store councils and 
management committees, a company-wide magazine called The Gazette and local magazines called 
The Chronicle in which any matter raised by a partner must be responded to by the relevant 
manager.  Finally, the company operates a system called ‘The Registry’ (Erdal, 2011) in which staff 
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are employed to liaise directly with members about the performance of their managers, enabling 
partners to by-pass line management if they need to express their views. 
In a common ownership co-operative, all property rights are indivisible, and surpluses are 
allocated by democratically controlled bodies for member and co-operative development. 
 The Co-operative Group, on the other hand, operates a system of individual membership.  
Consumers, upon joining, have an account opened for them, into which their share of profits are 
paid every 6 months.  Each member’s share of profits depends on their level of trading across the 
group of companies (including food retailers, pharmacies, travel companies, banking and financial 
service institutions, funeral directors, legal services and a motoring company).  Rather than store 
councils (as happens at John Lewis), the Co-operative Group operate area committees to which co-
operative members are elected.  There are also regional committees to uphold co-operative values 
and principles.
2
  Unlike John Lewis, Cooperative Group members have individual accounts and 
hold share capital in the organisation they own (albeit only a £1 share per member).  Payments are – 
legally speaking – dividends, not a bonus that is paid in addition to wages (Beaubein, 2011).  In a 
review of operational practices (Cooperative Commission, 2001), it was recommended that 70% of 
distributable profits should be paid as dividends to members, while 30% should be retained for 
community projects that express co-operative values and principles.  This being the case, the Co-
operative Group is more readily understood as a jointly owned enterprise which retains financial 
reserves under common (indivisible) ownership.   
In a jointly owned co-operative, members of a primary stakeholder group contribute capital and 
receive a share of surpluses, with the remainder allocated to indivisible reserves that are 
democratically controlled by members. 
A variation on this model is practiced in the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation (Whyte 
and Whyte, 1991).  In the industrial cooperatives, member accounts are created at the local credit 
union (Caja Laboral – see below).  Members contribute capital (typically equivalent to about two 
                                                 
2  The arrangements of the Co-operative Group are summarised at www.co-operative.coop.  To find 
the information, navigate to Home -> Sustainability -> Delivering Value -> Modern Co-operation -> 
Democratic Structure. 
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months pay) of which 20% is immediately allocated to collective reserves.  Each year, interest is 
paid on members’ capital, and between 30 – 70% of surpluses are allocated to their accounts.  The 
balance is allocated to reserves and joint enterprises that fund the future development of the 
co-operative economy.  While the amounts of capital invested and distributed to individual 
members are higher than the Co-operative Group, the system still observes the principle that 
members contribute share capital and receive dividends for their capital contribution.  It is a system 
of joint ownership in which a substantial proportion of wealth is allocated to reserves and secondary 
co-operatives that are commonly owned. 
 An interesting evolution of this, and an example of co-ownership, is the Caja Laboral.  This 
is the credit union created to support the Mondragon Cooperative Corporation and its individual 
members.  While John Lewis is wholly employee-owned, and the Cooperative Group wholly 
consumer-owned (Cooperatives UK, 2011a), the Caja has features of both.  Both employees and 
customers are members, and the governing council comprises four elected employee representatives 
and eight elected consumer representatives
3
.  The distribution of profits (surpluses) to members of 
the workforce is based not on the profitability of the credit union, but on the profitability of its 
customers (BBC, 1980).  This provides a powerful incentive for staff to work in the interests of 
their customers in a way that promotes sustainable long term wealth creation.  This hybrid 
arrangement results in an unusually close relationships between co-operative members and credit 
union staff, illustrating how co-ownership models can promote solidarity between primary 
stakeholders (see Oakeshott, 1990; Whyte and Whyte, 1991).  This multi-stakeholder approach that 
involves both producers and consumers offers an example of the associative democracy envisaged 
by Hirst (1994). 
In a co-owned co-operative, members of more than one primary stakeholder group contribute 
capital and receive a proportion of trading surpluses, with the remainder allocated to 
democratically controlled reserves. 
                                                 
3  Based on field notes collected by the author during a field visit on 5th/6th March 2003. 
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Case Studies in Democratic Management 
The act of including or excluding particular groups from membership (and thereby limiting their 
influence) is one of the processes that affects the distribution of power and wealth.  In different 
bodies of academic theory, the behaviour of “other” stakeholders is framed as problematic.  For 
example, in private companies, the behaviour of directors and managers is framed as the ‘problem’ 
of corporate governance by shareholders (Joerg et al., 2004; Slapnicar et al., 2004).  In both 
management and economic theory, the ‘problem’ of workforce motivation receives attention 
(Watson, 1996; Sloman and Sutcliffe, 2001).  In cooperative theory, the behaviour of a non-working 
investor class is framed as the ‘problem’, so much so that they are frequently excluded from 
membership (Oakeshott, 1990).   
As Vanek (1970) points out, traditional management theory regards labour as a cost to be 
minimised by paying a fixed wage in line with labour market ‘prices’.  This may apply equally in 
private companies (to maximise investor returns) and charities (to maximise the funds available for 
charitable projects).  Kalmi (2007) argues that this applies also to consumer co-operatives, resulting 
in HRM practices characteristic of investor-owned companies (Davis, 2004).  The reverse of this 
mindset can exist in charities and co-operatives with regard to outside investors.  As Ridley-Duff 
and Bull state:   
In this case, external investors are not permitted to buy equity in the charity or co-operative 
(although such rights are preserved when the charity or cooperative wishes to buy equity in 
other enterprises).  If external investment is permitted, the rights of investors are reduced 
either by barring them from membership, or adjusting their membership rights so that they 
do not acquire decision-making rights accorded to full members. 
Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011, p. 142 
As I will argue below, however, model rules that have evolved out of co-operative 
members’ experience of challenging single stakeholder models reformulate their constitutions and 
democratic fora to manage the competition and conflict that arises when primary stakeholders 
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compete for power with external funders and investors.  In examining these developments, it is 
worth recalling the comment of Michels’ (1961: 36) that: 
Democracy in large measure rests on the fact that no one group is able to secure a basis of 
power and command over the majority so that it can effectively suppress or deny the claims 
of the groups it opposes. 
These sentiments reflect Pateman (1970), Ellerman (1984, 1997) and Turnbull (1994, 2002) 
who argue for participative democracy in enterprise development.  Each emphasises how 
democratic rights attached to corporate citizenship rather than private property have a 
transformative effect on participation, innovation and enterprise performance (Forcadell, 2005).  
Attempts to institutionalise arrangements in business so that “no one group is able to secure a basis 
of power and control over the majority so that it can effectively suppress or deny the claims of the 
groups it opposes” represents a radical evolution in enterprise governance (Hirst, 1994).  Calls for 
new forms of co-operative started to develop in the mid-1990s based on an argument that 
co-operative businesses would thrive more effectively as multi-stakeholder enterprises (Major, 
1998).  They not only offer an alternative strategy for poverty alleviation, but also an alternative to 
private sector HRM practices (Willmott, 1993).  The approach involves rewriting business rules to 
remove barriers to solidarity between primary stakeholders (Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011). 
New Frontiers in Self-Management 
In this section, I examine three sets of model rules (Table 3) that evolved from practice to legitimise 
the interests of primary stakeholders.  I will firstly explore key characteristics of each set of rules by 
discussing how they attempt to change distributions of power and wealth.  Subsequently, I will 
explore the extent to which different rules still privilege one group over others and shape levels of 
participation in decision-making.   
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Table 3 – Multi-stakeholder Model Rules for Co-operatives 
Model Rules Brief Description 
Case 1 - Cooperative 
CIC Model 
 
Designed and published by Cooperatives UK in response to the introduction of Community 
Interest Company legislation in 2005.  Underpinned by a Company Limited by Guarantee, 
the model rules are framed to encourage active service-user and workforce membership on 
the basis of one-person, one-vote, with a commitment to consult: 
 Employees 
 Funders 
 Suppliers 
 Customers 
 Community representatives 
Case 2 - NewCo Model 
 
 
Designed by Morgan Killick and Bill Barker in 2002, with support from the Sheffield 
Community Economic Development Unit.  Underpinned by a Company Limited by Shares, a 
2004 version gave control and decision-making power to three classes of shareholder, and 
investment rights to a fourth: 
 Class A Shares (for social entrepreneurs) 
 Class B Shares (for charities and social enterprises) 
 Class C Shares (for employees) 
 Social Equity Shares (for supporting organisations) 
Case 3 - Surplus 
Sharing Model 
 
 
With a heritage stretching back to the work of Guy Major and Gavin Body in the mid-1990s, 
the surplus sharing rules developed by Rory Ridley-Duff at Sheffield Business School 
embrace co-operative principles across the labour/capital divide.  The rules  provide for 
active membership control on the basis of one-person, one vote, with special provisions for 
issuing: 
 Founder Shares 
 Labour Shares 
 Investor Shares 
Based on cases 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4, cited in Ridley-Duff and Bull, 2011, www.sagepub.co.uk/ridleyduff 
At first glance, each set of model rules appears to enfranchise both internal and external 
stakeholders.  The Cooperative CIC Model (Case 1) provides membership options for both service 
users (consumers) and workers (employees), but has no specific provision for financial investors.  
The Company Limited by Guarantee structure provides for membership that confers voting rights, 
but no automatic rights to profits and assets.  As a CIC, the rules include an asset lock: a clause 
naming a registered charity or other asset-locked social enterprise to which residual assets will be 
transferred upon dissolution.   In an unadapted form, Case 1 combines a multi-stakeholder approach 
with a common ownership model. 
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The NewCo Model (Case 2) provides for three groups to receive ordinary shares: founding 
social entrepreneur(s) and investors (Class A); social enterprises and charities (Class B); and 
employees (Class C).  Originally the balance of shareholdings was unequal.  Later, ‘social equity’ 
preference shares were created to enable support organisations to invest in the enterprise and 
received a fixed dividend.  An interesting recent development in one company using the NewCo 
model (ESP Projects Ltd) is a decision to increase the issue of Class A and C shares by a factor 
of 10.  This had the effect of increasing the shareholding of the workforce from about 8% to 46%.  
At the same time, the characteristics of Class C shares were rewritten to conform to Industrial 
Common Ownership standards, granting one vote per worker irrespective of the size of their 
holding, removing appreciation rights but maintaining income rights (see Table 4).  This has 
transformed the organisation from a hybrid social enterprise to a hybrid co-operative that mixes 
mutual and capitalist principles in enterprise design. 
The final Surplus Sharing Model (Case 3) permits founder shares, labour shares and 
investor shares.  Labour shares entitle the workforce to a proportion of surpluses (typically split 
50/50 with investor shareholders).  Founder shares recognise the interest of founding members in 
protecting the democratic ethos and social objectives of a co-operative.  Within each group, 
one-person, one-vote principles apply once membership grows beyond a fixed number of members.  
While this would not achieve recognition as a bona fide co-operative, over time (as founder 
members leave or die and their shares are cancelled) the enterprise transforms into a solidarity 
co-operative with both labour shareholders and investor shareholders sharing control and wealth 
distribution.  On the assumption that members of the workforce also hold investor shares, producers 
will always have a controlling interest.  However, a simple adaptation of the rules at incorporation 
can provide for a 50/50 split between consumer members who ‘invest’ through their trading 
activities, and worker members who ‘invest’ through their labour contribution. 
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What is striking about all these models is that they not only change the nature of company 
membership to include primary stakeholders, but also change wealth acquisition and distribution 
rights.  This accords with Ellerman's (1997) advocacy that property rights found in an 
investor-owned firm should be unbundled and separated into personal rights and property rights.  
Rights to vote and receive a share of surpluses become the personal rights of primary stakeholders 
(i.e. rights allocated to those who work in and/or trade with the enterprise).  Rights to accumulated 
assets can still be governed by property rights (so that both past and present members benefit from 
their appreciation in value). 
Of the three, only the Cooperative CIC Model (Case 1) can be described as common 
ownership (i.e. that monies invested are locked into the development of a commonly owned 
enterprise with assets held in trust for community benefit).  Case 2 represents a form of 
co-ownership, with blocks of shares held by different interest groups (founders, social economy 
shareholders and workers).  The precedent of reconstituting Class C shares to conform to social 
economy norms provides an innovate way to handle succession issues.  Case 3, on the other hand, 
recognises that the same people might have different relationships to the enterprise (as founders, 
providers of labour, and financial supporters) and seeks to reconcile this through representing these 
as share classes.  Following Ellerman (1997), labour shareholders give up income and voting rights 
(labour shares) when they leave the co-operative, but retain property rights distributed to them 
during their tenure (through investor shares).  Unlike co-operative models in which workers buy 
ordinary shares (or an EBT holds them on their behalf), the departure of worker-owners does not 
dilute or reduce the voting power of labour shareholders as a class (it just redistributes voting power 
amongst the workers that remain).  Similarly, increases in investor shareholdings do not change the 
power balance between investors and labour, only the distribution of property rights amongst 
investors. 
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The development of each set of model rules shows growing support for solidarity 
co-operatives that embrace co-ownership principles.  The Cooperative CIC Model (Case 1) has 
historical connections to the cooperative and industrial common ownership movement (ICOM) so it 
is unsurprising that there is no provision for equity investment.  It was developed in response to 
enquiries requesting a cooperative model for registration as a Community Interest Company (CIC).  
The other models have a more mixed heritage.  The Surplus Sharing Model (Case 3) was initially a 
product of a worker cooperative encountering problems raising finance from both members and 
external parties.  The first iteration of the rules were developed when it was found that government 
funding for cooperatives could not be accessed without the ability to convert loan finance into 
equity (Ridley-Duff, 2002).  The rules were further developed after collaborations with employers 
seeking to extend employee-ownership, with the goal of facilitating trust and community ownership 
alongside cooperative management (Ridley-Duff, 2010).  Of interest here is a mechanism to 
facilitate a gradual ‘succession’ in ownership (to the workforce) that does not involve a trade or 
private sale.  The NewCo Model (Case 2) on the other hand, was conceived during an attempt to 
establish an ICT organisation servicing third sector clients.  This allowed customers to share the 
costs of establishing the enterprise, shape the way that services are provided to meet their needs, 
and receive dividends.  Help was provided by a community enterprise development unit which 
accepted the need to reward founders and investors as well as employees and customers.  Whilst not 
a co-operative during its early years, the co-ownership form has developed over time to embrace co-
operative values and principles in the issue of Class C shares. 
Table 4 shows how the rights identified by Gates (1998: Appendix B) are allocated to 
different classes of shareholder in each of the case studies. 
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Table 4 – An Analysis of Member Rights in the Case Studies 
Rights Description 
Liquidation 
Rights 
Liquidation rights enable shareholders or creditors to force a company into liquidation if it becomes 
apparent that it is insolvent, or likely to go insolvent.  As Jensen (2006) argues, liquidation rights also 
give investors the ability to force a profitable company into liquidation (either to remove competition 
or cash in the value of its assets).  In all sets of model rules, multiple shareholder classes make it 
harder to liquidate a profitable company. 
Appreciation 
Rights 
Appreciation rights define how the value of an organisation is reflected in its share price.  A CLG (or 
CIC constituted as a CLG) has no shares, and therefore does not grant appreciation rights.  Case 1, 
therefore, has no shares that appreciate in value, but Cases 2 and 3 permit variations in share price to 
reflect the value of the enterprise.  Case 2 denies appreciation rights to social equity shareholders.  In 
one case, they have also been denied to Class C shareholders.  Case 3, on the other hand, denies 
appreciation rights to founders (although they can acquire these rights if they contribute labour and 
financial capital). 
The granting of appreciation rights (through share issues or payments into a capital account) can help 
substantially with the recruitment and retention of members.    
Transfer 
Rights 
Transfer rights permit the sale of assets and shares to other legal and natural persons.  Shares may 
not be transferable to prevent their acquisition by interests unsympathetic to the social aims of the 
co-operative, or to ensure that voting and incomes rights are retained by active members.  Case 1 
issues no share capital, but permits the transfer of other assets at market value.  Case 2 issues share 
capital, but does not permit the sales of shares by one shareholder class to another.  Case 3 does not 
permit the transfer of labour shares, but does allow investor shares to the traded. 
Income Rights Income rights define how income can be derived from co-operative membership (via loan interest 
and/or dividend payments).  In co-operatives, there may be a cap on loan interest and/or dividend 
payments.  Case 1 has no share capital and - as a CIC – is subject to statutory caps on payments to 
members.  Case 2 allows shareholders in Classes A, B and C to receive dividends on shareholdings.  
Case 3 includes rules that ensure surpluses are distributed 50 / 50 between labour and investor 
shareholders, and that 25% of surpluses are issued as investor shares to labour shareholders.  
Voting Rights Voting rights influence who can participate in decisions on mergers, acquisitions, dissolution, rule 
changes, and the election of a governing body and/or company officers.   Cases 1 and 3 establish 1 
person, 1 vote principles.  Case 2 allows voting based on shareholdings, but is structured so that two 
stakeholder groups must be in agreement before a resolution can be passed.  The creation of a larger 
block of class C shares with different characteristics means that one person, one vote principles apply 
when workers’ cast their votes.  Case 3 requires 1 person, 1 vote majorities in each class, plus 75% in 
favour overall, to pass a special resolution (required for mergers, dissolutions and rule changes). 
Information 
Rights 
Information rights define who can access information held by company officers and staff, and what 
information is covered.  Rights may be extended only to the governing body, or to all members.  In all 
Cases (1, 2 and 3), information rights are granted to all members during working hours. 
Public Rights Public rights can include a 'golden share' to protect the public interest, or social objects that are 
approved by the Charity Commission or Community Interest Company Regulator.  Case 1 is subject to 
public rights and regulation by the Community Interest Company regulator, but Cases 2 and 3 do not 
grant specific public rights. 
Of the three examples, only the Cooperative CIC Model – constituted as a Company 
Limited by Guarantee – is likely to be a good vehicle for fundraising from grant giving bodies and 
charitable trusts.  While this is not usually the priority of co-operatives trading in commercial 
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markets, it can be a concern in enterprises created for community benefit that contract with public 
authorities, local government bodies and charitable trusts.  These co-operatives can benefit from the 
inclusion of a dissolution clause that secures access to public/community funds.  
A CLG (or ‘asset-locked’ enterprise) is not as attractive, however, for raising finance from 
primary stakeholders or external investors because the arrangements rarely permit a return 
commensurate with the risks associated with an unsecured investment.  Faced with a choice 
between investing in one’s own co-operative or some other saving/investing scheme, a co-operative 
still has to make an offer that is sufficiently attractive to compete with other investment schemes.  
In the cases reviewed, only Cases 2 and 3 two explicitly build members’ financial capital. 
The enactment of associative democracy (Hirst, 1994) through solidarity co-operative 
models is not confined to these examples.  Somerset Rules – available since 2009 from Somerset 
Co-operative Services – entrench multi-stakeholder principles at the point of formation.  As their 
website (http://www.somerset.coop/somersetrules) stated in December 2011: 
…we applied to the Financial Services Authority to become a 'sponsoring body' able to 
register new IPS co-operatives. That was so we could create a new standard format for 
co-operative rules – multi-stakeholder co-operatives, also known as 'Somerset Rules'. 
These rules have certain advantages over existing model rules provided by Co-ops UK and 
others.  They enable a co-operative enterprise to be 'shared' by more than one group of 
stakeholders.  For example, a community supported agriculture scheme could be 50% 
controlled by producers, and 50% by consumers. Or a business could be 60% controlled by 
its workers, and 40% by the local community. 
This development brings the multi-stakeholder principle into the traditional heartland of 
co-operatives (Industrial and Provident Society Law).  Industrial and Provident Societies (IPS) were 
popular throughout the UK and former colonies of the British Empire in the nineteenth century, 
particularly in organisations that protected the health and well-being of the community.  As both the 
state and private sectors retreat from welfare and community enterprise, the IPS form is making a 
comeback as groups of citizens take ownership of local sports clubs, community shops, care 
organisations, housing and health services (Brown, 2004; Simmonds, 2008).  Like Case 3, Somerset 
Rules enable individual members to share in both dividends and the distribution of collective assets 
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(although this is limited to 30% of the total).  IPSs incur higher registration fees, but lower legal 
fees for community share issues.  They currently provide a cost effective approach for co-operatives 
to raise capital from their communities (Brown, 2004). 
Critique and Conclusions 
Close examination of each multi-stakeholder model reveals that they are not free of potential 
conflicts between primary stakeholders, and that the relative power of one primary stakeholder over 
another is likely to remain an issue.   As such, they are vulnerable to the criticism that they 
constitute a naïve form of liberalism that ignores or glosses over disparities in power, and which 
might even entrench and reproduce existing asymmetries of power.  The recognition of ‘other’ 
stakeholders does not necessarily mean that they will participate equally or achieve the 
collaborative culture that their advocates expect them to create.  Indeed, without member education 
and support services, they may not even become aware of the rights they gain through membership, 
or how to exercise them. 
Nevertheless, each set of model rules reopens the question raised by Davies (2002) 
regarding who can be a company member, and the rights and obligations that members acquire.  
Each acts as a template for reframing business norms so that corporate citizenship limits or replaces 
property rights as the basis of membership.  Philosophically this represents a shift away from 
financial capital as primary, to reframe it as a secondary form of investment.  The recognition of 
customers, producers and employees as investors (through their trading, producing and labour 
contributions) is a paradigm shift in business thinking (Kuhn, 1970) that advances the possibility of 
the kind of economy envisaged by Hirst (1994).  While devising a set of rules does not guarantee 
that the rules are followed, each emergent model challenges private sector norms in a number of 
ways, and shifts business thinking towards a new combinations of representative and direct 
democracy (Schumpeter, 1942; Pateman, 1970). 
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The model rules provide templates for practitioners to express their co-operative identity and 
acquire control over human, social and financial capital in enterprise development.  In doing so, 
they provide concrete expressions of common ownership, joint ownership and co-ownership that 
contribute to the development of a co-operative economy.  Importantly, this goal is not achieved by 
superimposing employee and stakeholder consultation on top of charity or company templates.  
Instead, there is an attempt to rewrite legal principles and social norms in order to reframe what a 
co-operative model can achieve.  New multi-stakeholder models embrace pragmatic concerns that 
'labour' needs customers and capital to thrive, and that 'capital' needs engaged customers and 
workers to increase in value.  The emergence of co-owned solidarity co-operatives suggests that the 
'common bond' suggested by Parnell (2011) can go beyond the immediate and narrow economic 
interests of members to a broader political interest in the creation of a co-operative economy. 
Using case studies, I have explored the distinctive characteristics of commonly owned, 
jointly owned and co-owned co-operative models, and clarified how they differ from privatised and 
nationalised enterprises.  To take this forward, more research is needed to clarify the contexts in 
which each thrive, and to compare the relative performance of single-stakeholder and multi-
stakeholder co-operatives in different industry settings.  Lastly, further debate on legal barriers to 
co-owned co-operatives would be helpful.  Why, for example, can single-stakeholder co-operatives 
obtain tax breaks for employee shareholdings while the same tax breaks are not available to 
employees in multi-stakeholder co-owned co-operatives?  If research can clarify the benefits each 
type of co-operative creates, more appropriate regulatory and tax regimes can be created. 
 
Dr Rory Ridley-Duff worked for over a decade in a worker co-operative that was a co-founder of Social Enterprise 
London.  He is now course leader for the MSc Co-operative and Social Enterprise Management degree at 
Sheffield Business School and a board member of both Co-operatives Yorkshire & Humber and Social Enterprise 
Yorkshire & Humber.  His most recent book is Understanding Social Enterprise: Theory and Practice (Sage 
Publications). 
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